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CHOICE OF LAW FOR COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS
LEONARD F. MANNING*
The doctrine of stare decisis, it has been said, is of minor moment
as it touches upon tort liability. But stare decisis is rooted in a settled
and sensible policy with relation to the construction of a contract.
That is so, we are told, because we do not, normally, premeditate and
plan our tortious conduct. But we do—lawyers and businessmen
alike—plan our contracts in reliance on precedents. Thus, stability
and certainty, which the law of contracts demands, are of greater
concern to the commercial lawyer than they are to the negligence
practitioner.
Isn't it odd, then, and unfortunate too, that choice-of-law rules
in tort cases, where certainty is not an essential virtue, should be so
certain while choice-of-law rules in contract cases, where uncertainty
is a vice, should be so uncertain? The Restatement tells us with
monotonous regularity that the law of the locus delicti determines tort
liability,' and it is a rare court which would dare disagree.' In con-
tract cases, however, the courts have sounded discordant notes and
the Restatement's rules for choice of law' are certainly not gospel
and probably do not represent prevailing law.
* Professor of Law, Fordharn University School of Law; A.B. 1939, St. Peter's
College; LL.B. 1947, Harvard University.
1 Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 377-90 (1934).
2 see, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163
(1928), where a Connecticut statute (imposing upon any person, renting or leasing a
motor vehicle to another, liability for any damages caused by the operation of such
motor vehicle while so rented or leased) was found applicable to an accident which
occurred in Massachusetts. Judge Goodrich finds this case at odds with the prevailing
rule which would require that Massachusetts law determine the defendant's liability.
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 279 (3rd ed. 1949). See also, Dyke v. Erie Ry. Co., 45
N.Y. 113 (1871) where a contract approach was taken in a tort case and the law of
New York, where the contract of passage was made and was substantially to be per-
formed, measured the defendant's liability although the accident took place in Pennsyl-
vania.
8 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 332 (1934) provides:
The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect of a
promise with respect to
(a) capacity to make the contract;
(b) the necessary form, if any, in which the promise must be made;
(c) the mutual consent or consideration, if any, required to make a promise
binding;
(d) any other requirements for making a promise binding;
(e) fraud, illegality, or any other circumstances which make a promise void
or voidable;
(f) except as stated in § 358, the nature and extent of the duty for the per-
formance of which a party becomes bound;
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That this should be is not surprising. A contract involves a
"meeting of the minds" of the contracting parties or, more accurately,
a unity of expressed intent. The "intention of the parties" has always
been the cornerstone of the contract. But "intention" is not easily
ascertained and reasonable judges reasonably find the same words
and acts indicate different and often contradictory intents. A contract,
even a very simple one, is generally a multi-faceted document. In a
tort case a single issue is usually presented: was the defendant's con-
duct actionable under the law of the place where the conduct occurred
or the injury was inflicted? In contract litigation the issues may be
multiple and varied. They may relate to the capacity of the parties,
the form of the contract, its interpretation, its essential validity, or
performance under it. A simple promissory note or an innocuous
looking bill of exchange may produce many-towered problems.
Historically, and logically enough, the "intention of the parties" was,
as noted, the main road which the courts travelled to meet these prob-
lems, the main road which "ran by to many-towered Camelot."
In searching for intention we seek a manifestation of something
subjective. Motives move into contemplation; vague concepts of
"substantial justice" may have influence; as often as not, we find the
court by a process of post hoc presumptions finding intention as a
result of items which the parties themselves may never have con-
sidered but which it is now felt should have been considered by them.
In contract choice-of-law cases identical facts never did, and do not
today, guarantee identical results. Even where the intention of the
parties is expressed with sufficient clarity, judges have frequently
been unable to agree as to applicable presumptions, supposedly
founded on that intention, which would assign with inflexibility a
particular law to determine a particular issue. The consequence has
been considerable confusion and conflict.'
(g) the time when and the place where the promise is by its terms to be
performed;
(h) the absolute or conditional character of the promise.
§ 358 provides:
The duty for the performance of which a party to a contract is bound will
be discharged by compliance with the law of the place of performance of the
promise with respect to:
(a) the manner of performance;
(b) the time and locality of performance;
(c) the person or persons by whom or to whom performance shall be made
or rendered;
(d) the sufficiency of performance;
(e) excuse for non-performance.
To the effect that the law of the "place of making" is the law which the parties are
presumed to have intended and that, therefore, such law determines the essential
242
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The situation with regard to commercial contracts is no different.'
If certainty, not only to determine the content of a contract but also
to fix the choice of law governing both its content and validity, is of
importance to contracts generally, it is a prime necessity for com-
mercial contracts. It is hackneyed to note that such contracts are
made in the market place, often quickly, sometimes informally and
occasionally orally. The order to purchase shares of stock on an
exchange, for example, might be of such a nature, and if variations
in applicable law should be possible, buyer and seller alike would
undoubtedly prefer to have a specific law apply and would be more
at ease if it were fixed and absolute. On the other hand a commercial
contract is frequently the result of extended negotiations and careful
draftsmanship and words chosen with care, e.g., the contract or
commitment made by a bank to make a mortgage loan which, no
doubt, is formulated, at least by the bank, with a specific governing
law in mind. Whatever law it might be, the selection should have
the stamp of certainty on it.
Indeed, when the commercial transaction touches two states,
two countries, or two jurisdictions, uniformity in the determination
of applicable law might very well be an end in itself. The "rolling
English drunkard" may have made the "rolling English road" but
the road to Camelot should be paved not with good intentions but
with uniformity in choice of law, a uniformity which will give stability
to the planned commercial contract and at the same time permit
validity of a contract, see, Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 2, § 110; Brown v. Ford Motor
Co., 48 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1931); but see Zerratello v. Hammerstein, 231 Pa. 56, 79
Atl. 922 (1911) (the law of the place of performance, being in the contemplation of
the parties, governs essential validity) ; even where the place of performance is said
to govern essential validity, we have been told that the law of the place of making
should determine the formal validity of the contract, Story, Conflict of Laws, § 260
(8th ed. 1883) ; Goodrich, supra, § 109 and cases cited therein. The law of the place
of performance controls performance, including allowable excuses for non-performance,
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15 F. Supp.
927 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
With a lapse into Latin, it has been said that the lex loci contractus is the law
to consider, Goodrich, supra, § 110, pp. 321-22; but in Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S.
124 (1882), kx loci contractus was identified with the lex loci solutionis although the
contract was made in New York and was to be performed in Louisiana. So, we might
ask, what is meant by the kx loci contractus? Is the Latin to be translated literally
to mean the place where the contract is made or is it to be given the Greeks' Homeric
sweep and taken to mean the seat of the obligation, or the law in the contemplation of
the parties when the contract was made?
5 For a determination of the law governing the question of whether a promissory
note is negotiable or whether a particular writing is a promissory note or a bill of
exchange, compare Carnegie v. Morrison, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 381 (1841) (the law of
the place where the bill or note is issued controls) with Sykes v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of
Des Moines, 78 Kan. 688, 98 Pac. 206 (1908) (the law of the place of payment controls).
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easy recognition of the validity and negotiability of, or in general,
the obligations inherent in, the contract which passes over the counter
or from hand to hand.
The compilers of the Commercial Code were concerned with the
problem in 1950, as were the formulators of the Restatement, many
years before. The Code originally proposed rules for choice of law
which were accepted when Pennsylvania passed the enactment.' But
Judge Goodrich and his colleagues retreated thereafter under a
fusillade of forceful criticism .' as a result of which amendments
eliminated, with one exception, the new proposals. The early attempts
by the Code draftsmen to bring harmony from the discord which
surrounded contract choice-of-law rules resulted in the veiled approval
of the "contacts" theory, which was thought to be of the great
catalyst, which would not only achieve justice but which would
reconcile all prior cases.
This theory was not a new concept when it was enacted by the
New York Court of Appeals in Auten v. Auten, 8 but the case, repre-
senting as it did a significant decision by a respected Court in a very
influential state, gave great impetus to the theory. This decision, at
least insofar as it relates to commercial contracts or more specifically
to negotiable instruments (or, in the language of the Code, com-
mercial paper) is somewhat the burden of this article. Is the contacts
approach, as formulated in Auten, worthy of emulation or is Auten, in
commercial cases, doomed to beat a lonesome drum?
THE CODE'S CHOICE
Assuming a formal contract for the sale of machinery signed in
Michigan by Michigan residents, with all or substantially all of the
performance to take place in Massachusetts, what law would be applic-
able under the Commercial Code for the resolution of all questions
saving only interpretation?
The Code first recognizes that the contract involves a consensual
relationship9 and permits the parties to stipulate that the law of any
6 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 1-105 (1953, April 6, P.L. 3, § 1-105). This section has
since been revised to conform to the present version of the Code discussed later in this
article.
7 See, e.g., 1 Report of New York State Law Revision Commission, Hearings on
the Uniform Commercial Code, especially the bibliography p. 37 (1954). See also, 9
New York County Lawyers Association Bar Bulletin 30 (1951).
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
9
 UCC § 1-105, Comment (1) states: "an agreement as to choice of law may
sometimes take effect as a shorthand expression of the intent of the parties as to
matters governed by their agreement, even though the transaction has no significant
contact with the jurisdiction chosen."
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jurisdiction, bearing a reasonable relation to the transaction, shall
govern their rights and duties)° But what is a reasonable relation?
The comments state that both the places of execution and of per-
formance bear a reasonable relation to the transaction, leaving the
impression that only these two locales bear such relation. The test
we are expressly told," however, is similar to that laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse
Co." In this case the agreement executed in New York between a
New York resident and a Pennsylvania corporation contemplated
performance in Pennsylvania. As such, the transaction was valid
under Pennsylvania law but void in New York law. There was no
express stipulation that Pennsylvania law should be applicable but
there was the stipulation for payment or performance in Pennsylvania.
Mr. Justice Stone in regarding this as the equivalent states:
"But, in the view we take, we think it immaterial
whether the contract was entered into in New York or
Pennsylvania, . . . Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation
having its place of business in Philadelphia, could legiti-
mately lend funds outside the state, and stipulate for repay-
ment in Pennsylvania in accordance with its laws, and at the
rate of interest there lawful, even though the agreement for
the loan were entered into in another state, where a different
law and a different rate of interest prevailed . . . .
"Here respondent, organized and conducting its business
in Pennsylvania, was subject to laws of that state, and had
a legitimate interest in seeking their benefit. The loan
contract which stipulated for repayment there, and which
thus chose that law as governing its validity, cannot be con-
demned as an evasion of the law of New York, which might
otherwise be deemed applicable. . . ." 13
Obviously the parties intended a binding contract. Were New
York law to be applied there would have been no enforceable contract,
for under that law the agreement would be usurious. The ultimate
choice-of-law in Seeman was a reasonable one. Reasonableness can
however be a hydra-headed monster and it is questionable whether
the Code has performed a Herculean task. "Ordinarily," says the
Code, "the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a signifi-
cant enough portion of the making or performance of the contract
UCC § 1-105(1).
It UCC § 1 - 105, Comment 1.
12 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
13 Id. at 407 -09.
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is to occur or occurs."" That was so in Seeman and that is "ordi-
narily" the case, but the place of execution and the place of perform-
ance do not present an inexorable dilemma.
There might be other jurisdictions which have, in the language of
Justice Stone, a "normal" connection with the transaction. If A and
B, Massachusetts residents, were to execute, while on vacation in
Vermont, a contract requiring performance in Connecticut, might
they not reasonably stipulate that Massachusetts law shall fix their
mutual obligations? Put in the abstract, does the domicil of both or
even of one of the parties have a reasonable relation to the transac-
tion? There is no answer in Seeman. There is no answer in the Code.
And what is a court to do if the parties stipulate that the law of the
place of performance shall determine their rights and duties and that
law is found to void the contract otherwise valid under the law of
the place of execution? Are we to permit a stipulation to nullify a
contract between parties who in good faith believed, at least until a
dispute arose and they consulted their lawyers, that they had a valid
and enforceable agreement? Again no answer is forthcoming either
from Seeman or from the Code.
What law—again assuming the transaction has contacts with two
or more states—applies in the absence of a stipulation? Originally,
the authors of the Code seemed of a mind to have the Code applied
whenever any state having a relation to the transaction had adopted
the Code. 15 That was the Code's ill concealed attempt; in its early
drafts, at coercion by choice of law. It encountered Constitutional
criticism.' The authors were not so revolutionary in the final version.
Failing a stipulation as to choice of law, the Code now adds, "this
Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this
state. 7" 1 There is more than a wisp of a suggestion that the Code
shall be applied whenever Constitutionally possible. But Comments
(2) and .(3) to § 1-105 do a kind of Lambeth Walk on this bold sug-
gestion. Comment (2) states:
"Where there is no agreement as to the governing law,
the Act is applicable to any transaction having an appro-
priate relation to any state which enacts it. Of course the
Act applies to any transaction which takes place in its
entirety in a state which has enacted the Act. But the mere
fact that suit is brought in a state does not make it appro-
14 Supra note 11.
15 UCC	 1-105 (Final Text Edition 1951).
10 See note 7 supra, and the articles cited therein.
17 UCC § 1-105.
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priate to apply the substantive law of that state. Cases
where a relation to the enacting state is not appropriate
include, for example, those where the parties have clearly
contracted on the basis of some other law, as where the Iaw
of the place of contracting and the law of the place of
contemplated performance are the same and are contrary
to the law under the Code."
Comment (3) adds that "where a transaction has significant contacts
with a state which has enacted the Act and also with other jurisdic-
tions, the question what relation is appropriate is left to judicial
decision."
There are contrary views, no doubt, but I take this to mean
that we are back where we started. Choice of law, under the Code,
is left almost in its entirety to judicial decision. The intention of the
parties is underscored, to be sure, but it is not beatified or made a
sine qua non and a subdued note is sounded in Comment (3) on be-
half of the "contacts" theory. One conclusion is certain: the Restate-
ment's rather rigid rules are rejected—unless returned by judicial de-
cision—and now, we may ask, should the fixed rules of the Restate-
ment give way completely to this "intention" test or to the "contacts"
approach or to both? In that connection consider the contacts con-
templated by the New York court in Auten v. Auten.
THE PRELUDE AND ELUDE OF AUTEN
Mr. and Mrs. Auten were citizens and domiciliaries of England
at the time of their marriage in England in 1917. Both remained
British subjects. Mrs. Auten, as well as two children of the marriage,
remained, at all times pertinent to the subsequent litigation, domiciled
and resident in England. It was not found as a fact but it was evident
enough that Mr. Auten retained his English domicil although in 1931
he deserted his wife and children and came to New York. The follow-
ing year he obtained a Mexican divorce and thereafter went through
the formalities of "marrying" another woman. Hoping to adjust
their differences, Mrs. Auten came to New York in 1933. In June
of that year, a separation agreement was executed in New York
whereunder Mr. Auten undertook to pay a New York trustee k50 a
month for "the account of" Mrs. Auten to provide for her support
and for that of the children. The trustee's only duty was to forward
the amounts paid by Mr. Auten to Mrs. Auten who had, immediately
after executing the agreement, returned to England.
The separation agreement stipulated that Mrs. Auten would not
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institute any suit for separation and that she would not cause any
complaint to be lodged against him by reason of his Mexican divorce.
Nevertheless, Mrs. Auten did, in 1934, file a petition in an English
court for judicial separation. Mr. Auten was served in New York
with process relating to the English action and an order was entered
requiring him to pay alimony pendente lite. The English action
never proceeded to trial. Eventually, when Mr. Auten discontinued
the support payments required by the separation agreement, Mrs.
Auten instituted a New York action for installments due under the
separation agreement and it was that action which reached the Court
of Appeals in 1954.
The decision turned on choice of law. It was assumed, as the
lower court had held, that under New York law the institution of the
English suit for judicial separation operated as a repudiation of the
separation agreement and that Mrs. Auten could not, therefore,
recover thereon. It was conceded that under the law of England the
suit for judicial separation did not operate as a repudiation of the
separation agreement.
The court held that the English law controlled. It counted off
the innumerable English contacts and noted the dearth of New York
contacts. The parties were married in England; they were English
domiciliaries and English citizens; the children resided in England;
the agreement was ultimately to be performed in England; it called
for payment in English pounds rather than U.S. dollars. Quite
obviously the English contacts far outnumbered the New York
contacts.
Auten recognized the prevailing confusion which surrounded
contract cases involving choice of law. It suggested that the contacts
theory might bring harmony from the discord and that, at least, it
offered a definite medium for rationalizing results of prior cases. It
rejected the Restatement's fixed rules and announced that thereafter
the contacts approach, the "center of gravity" test, would in New
York determine choice of law in contract litigation. But, because
Auten was bent on formulating a unitary universal rule, because it
was bent on being all things to all cases, Auten, I would suggest,
failed.
In non-commercial contracts, should the contacts test be only
an exercise in counting? If not, if we are to consider the quality of
the contacts, should our ultimate concern be the discovery of the
state with the superior interest or the fashioning of the intention
of the parties?
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The Auten court, although in the end it simply counted the
contacts, talked from both sides of the mouth. It first stated:
"Although this 'grouping of contacts' theory may, per-
haps, afford less certainty and predictability than the rigid
general rules, the merit of its approach is that it gives to the
place 'having the most interest in the problem' paramount
control over the legal issues arising out of a particular
factual context, thus allowing the forum to apply the policy
of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the out-
come of [the] particular litigation."'
but followed this immediately with the thought that,
(L
. . . Moreover, by stressing the significant contacts, it
enables the court, not only to reflect the relative interests
of the. several jurisdictions involved, but also to give effect to
the probable intention of the parties and consideration to
`whether one rule or the other produces the best practical
result.'
It is to be noted that the issue here, repudiation, related to
performance and, as the place of ultimate performance, English law
would, under the Restatement's rule, apply.' But Auten made it
clear that English law was chosen not because England was the place
of performance but because England had the greater number of
contacts.
Auten did not involve a commercial contract. Nor was Auten
unannounced in New York. Only a year before, the New York
Court of Appeals had espoused the contacts test in a very strong
dictum in Rubin v. Irving Trust Co." In Rubin it appeared that
plaintiff and defendant's testator, while in Florida, had made an
oral contract under which defendant's testator agreed that he would
change his will. The court treated this as an oral contract to make a
will, which was at odds with the New York statute of frauds but
valid and enforcible under the law of Florida. Defendant's testator
was domiciled in New York at the time the contract was made. He
died domiciled in New York and his estate was being administered
in the New York courts. The case was strikingly identical to the
Massachusetts case of Emery v. Burbank. 22
18 Supra note 8, at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
19
 Ibid.
29 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 355, 358 (1934).
21 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
22 163 Mass, 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895).
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The precise question posed by the Rubin court was whether the
New York statute of frauds was a matter of substance or a matter
of procedure. It found it unnecessary to answer the question. Briefly
put, it reasoned that the New York statute of frauds would apply,
if procedural, because New York was the forum and that the New
York statute of frauds would also apply, if substantive, because New
York was the domicil of the decedent at death. It came close to
saying, but did not, that this was a commercial contract and that,
therefore, there was no reason to apply Florida law as the place of
execution. It finally added by way of dictum, as noted, that New
York had the greater number of contacts with the transaction and
that New York law was, therefore, the appropriate choice of govern-
ing substantive law as well as procedural law.
The Rubin court sounded like a court with a desire but not the
daring to make new law. It posed "iffy" questions and gave "iffy"
answers. It relied in great detail on Justice Holmes decision in Emery
v. Burbank but it carried the Holmes reasoning beyond its logical
conclusion and beyond its logical extreme. Emery v. Burbank was a
carefully and thoroughly reasoned decision. It recognized that the
domicil of a testator has the principal interest in his personal estate
and that it has the predominant interest to protect the estate against
fraudulent and fictitious claims. For that reason alone Holmes applied
the Massachusetts statute of frauds to an oral contract made in Maine
by a Massachusetts domiciliary. In other words, Massachusetts law
applied because Massachusetts had the superior governmental con-
cern. There was no question of intent. No ritual of counting contacts.
Rubin recognized that, too, but the Rubin court went on to clutter
up an otherwise discerning decision with talk abbut contacts. It has
the same fault I find with Auten v. Auten.
Rubin was correct in applying New York law as Auten was
correct in applying English law. But Rubin was correct only because
New York was the decedent's last domicil, the jurisdiction wherein
his estate was being administered, and Auten was correct only because
England was the domicil of the parties, the jurisdiction wherein the
wife and children would have become a charge upon the state.
England had the paramount interest in the support of its own
domiciliaries. If we are to consider contacts, our concern should be
for quality rather than the quantity of the contacts. We should—in
a case like Rubin or Auten or Emery v. Burbank—look to the juris-
diction which has the greater concern for the parties, the greater
governmental interest in the transaction. This is so because neither
Auten nor Rubin nor Emery involved a commercial contract and there
2S0
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is lesser reason to ascertain the intention of the parties. To be sure,
the contacts test produces some evidence of the intention of the
parties. But is the intention we ultimately construct a fictitious
intention or is it actual and genuine? Do the parties to an ordinary
contract ever think—aside from cases where we have an express
stipulation—in terms of choice of law?
Now if we assume that with regard to commercial contracts the
intention of the parties should be a prime consideration, does it follow
that the contacts test is the answer? Putting this question aside for
the moment, let us consider three older cases which illustrate a sensible
attempt to apply what we may call a discovery-of-intention approach.
TRADITIONAL RULES OF INTENTION
Hyatt v. Bank of Kentucky" involved a suit by the indorsee
against the indorser of a promissory note issued in Louisiana but
indorsed and delivered by the indorser to the indorsee in Kentucky.
The court held that the legal effect of the indorsement so far as it
applies to indorser and indorsee must be determined by Kentucky
law. It said:
"The assignment of a note, as has been often adjudged,
is of itself a contract, by which the party making the assign-
ment assumes certain liabilities, to be regulated and deter-
mined by the law of the place where the assignment is made,
in the absence of a contract or agreement upon his part
by which he assumes liabilities created by the laws of an-
other state or place different from the law of the place where
the contract or assignment is made."'
In Badger Machinery Co. v. United States Bank & Trust Co. of
Santa Fe, N.M.," certain bondholders to whom the bonds were
negotiated in New Mexico sought to collect against the corporation
which had executed and issued the bonds in Wisconsin. The corporate
maker asserted two defenses: fraud on the part of the payee and
absence of consideration for the issuing of the bonds. These defenses
were sufficient, under Wisconsin law, against any party not a holder
in due course. The bondholders were not holders in due course under
Wisconsin law but it was assumed that they would be under New
Mexico law. Here, then, the indorsee, a subseqeunt party, was suing
23 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) 193 (1871).
I24 Id. at 197.
25 166 Wis. 18, 163 N.W. 188 (1917).
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the maker, and not, as in Hyatt, his immediate indorser. The court
applied Wisconsin law and stated:
lf 
. . In the instant case the bonds were Wisconsin contracts,
payable in Wisconsin; the maker of them, the Columbia
County Electric Light & Power Company, is a Wisconsin
corporation; and the appellant, the United States Bank &
Trust Company, is enforcing its claim in a Wisconsin court.
True, the contract between Bridge, who sold the bonds to
appellant, and appellant may be considered as made outside
of Wisconsin, and if the action here were between appellant
and Bridge, a different question would be presented. The
issues involved in the case at bar are between the maker of
the paper involved and the appellant, who purchased the
paper and claims to be a holder for value in due course.
"The laws of Wisconsin became a part of the contract
of the maker in the instant case, and determine whether the
holder is a bona fide holder for value in due course or not. 72°
Like Badger, and unlike Hyatt, United States v. Guaranty Trust
Company of New liork 27
 also involved rights as between the original
maker or drawer and a subsequent indorsee. There the U.S. Vet-
erans Bureau drew a check on the Treasurer of the United States
to the order of a Yugoslavian gentleman named Louis Macakanja.
His address in Yugoslavia was given on the face of the check and it
was mailed to him in Yugoslavia. The check never reached Mr.
Macakanja. It did arrive at the Slavenska Bank in Yugoslavia which
took the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that Mr.
Macakanja's indorsement had been forged. Slavenska indorsed it to
the Guaranty Trust Company which in turn collected the face amount
through the Federal Reserve Bank. The Treasurer of the United
States on learning of the forgery sued Guaranty Trust to recover the
proceeds of the check. Under the law of the District of Columbia,
where the check was both drawn and payable, the forged indorsement
was wholly inoperative. The law of Yugoslavia provided that the
transferee in due course acquires, despite the forgery, not only a good
title to the instrument but also the right to collect and retain the
proceeds. The court applied Yugoslavian law. Justice Brandeis
observed that:
". .. under settled principles of conflict of laws, adopted
by both federal and state courts, the validity of a transfer
26 Id. at 20-21, 163 N.W. at 189.
27 293 U.S. 340 (1934).
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of a chattel brought into a country by the consent of the
owner is governed by its law; and that rule applies to
negotiable instruments. . . . Here, the rule is particularly
applicable; for the Government, having made the check
payable to one therein described as resident in Yugoslavia
and having mailed it to his Yugoslavian address, must be
deemed to have intended that it should be negotiated there,
according to the law of that country. It was thereby given
something of the quality of a foreign bill; although tech-
nically the check was delivered within the District when
mailed there.'
Are these cases consistent? There have been varying views
expressed by eminent authorities which suggest some inconsistency
and which, in relation to each other, are difficult to harmonize.'
It is interesting to note that each court talked in terms of the intention
of the parties, what law the indorser, the drawer or maker con-
templated or must have contemplated. The Kentucky court in Hyatt
spoke of the justice of the presumption "that the party intended to
be bound by the law of the place or state where the contract was
made." The court in Badger Machinery Co. spoke of the laws of
Wisconsin becoming "a part of the contract of the maker" and Justice
Brandeis' opinion in the Guaranty Trust Co. case is instinct with
intention. But in each case it is an "intention" which is poured into
fixed and specific moulds to produce distinct but conforming rules.
Hyatt involved an action exclusively between indorser and
indorsee. They contemplated the law of the "place of indorsement"
and that law fixed their rights and liabilities. In the Badger and
Guaranty Trust cases the rights existing as between dravier or maker
and subsequent holder were put in issue—but with an important and
critical distinction, In Badger the defense which the maker asserted
related to the issuance of the instrument. It alleged that there was a
fraud, with a resulting failure of consideration, imposed upon it in
Wisconsin at the time the bonds were originally delivered to the payee.
In the Guaranty Trust case the defense raised did not pertain to the
original issuance of the check but to the transfer which had taken
place in Yugoslavia. There is, therefore, a sustained consistency in
the three cases. It would seem, also, that they are in harmony with
the Restatement's position.m
28 Id. at 345-46.
23 Compare Leflar, Conflict of Laws 252 (1947), with Stumberg, Conflict of Laws
250-51 (2d ed. 1951), and Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 343 n.132 (3d ed. 1949).
313 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 349 (1934), states: "The validity and effect of
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What result would the contacts test produce in each of these
cases? The balance of contacts is weighted in favor of Louisiana in
Hyatt and, as obviously absurd as the result might be, it would not
be inconceivable for a court employing the contacts test to determine
the indorser's liability to his indorsee in accordance with the law of
the place where the note was originally issued. It should also be noted
that in Badger, New Mexico's contacts were almost equal to those
found in Wisconsin and that in the Guaranty Trust case the District's
contacts outnumbered those of Yugoslavia. The commercial lawyer
who must counsel his client might just as well as let the client count
the contacts and choose the applicable law—assuming the client can
add and subtract. The lawyer is left to whirl in the core of a crude
analogy, the "center of gravity."
At the same time, it must be noted, the rubric and result of
each case harmonizes with considerations of "governmental interests"
if "governmental interests" are concerned at all with commercial
contracts. Assuming such concern, certainly Kentucky had an interest
in the Kentucky contract between indorser and indorsee superior to
that of Louisiana; Wisconsin's concern for the fraud there practiced
upon the maker was superior to that of New Mexico; and the District
of Columbia had no reason to be concerned with a transfer which
took place in Yugoslavia.
CONCLUSION
We were told over one hundred years ago that the negotiable
instrument was a "courier without luggage."' The courier rule—
aimed at excluding oral modifications— was aimed at putting some
certainty into negotiable instruments. It is quite unreasonable, then,
to let conflicting choice-of-law rules destroy the certainty just as
soon as the instrument crosses state lines. Because of conflicts within
conflict-of-laws rules, the courier has become an Argus and the lawyer
who drafts such an instrument must also be "Panoptes" with an eye
on the law of every jurisdiction in which the bill or note may wander.
Auten v. Auten found two sources to justify its contacts con-
cept. It spoke of reaching the intention of the parties; it spoke of
satisfying the legitimate concerns of the states which had a relation
a transfer of a negotiable instrument are determined by the law of the place where the
instrument is at the time of its transfer." Comment e to this section states: "While
any defense which grows out of the original making or discounting of a negotiable
instrument is governed by the law of the place of contracting, a defense which grows
out of the circumstances of the transfer is determined by the law of the place of
transfer."
31 Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346-47 (1846).
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to the controversy. These are not only bases for choice-of-law
rules. In the case of commercial transactions particularly, certainty
is an essential consideration and uniformity in choice-of-law rules,
if not an end in itself, is in itself of sufficient weight to counterbalance
the ballast of both intention and governmental interests. "It is to the
interest of trade and commerce," said the court in the Hyatt case,"
"that there should be some fixed and permanent rule governing con-
tracts of this character."
Putting aside for the moment an express stipulation for govern-
ing law, the intention of the parties is at best a speculative thing.
It is more often than not a complete fiction—fabricated by the court
out of the parties' presumed knowledge of the law. If we must pre-
sume that a person is familiar with the law of a particular forum
then the law of his domicil is a more plausible choice than the law
of a place where he may happen to sign a contract or where the
contract may happen to require delivery. Yet domicil is rarely per-
mitted to govern contractual relationships.
The Commercial Code has accepted "intention" absolutely in
only one particular instance—where the parties stipulate for the law
of a particular jurisdiction. With that there can be no quarrel. It is
in fact a major step forward. There we can be reasonably certain
that we are dealing with the actual intention of the parties. But in
implying or, at least, in leaving open the possibility that a stipulation
will be limited to the place of making or the place of performance,
the Code is not a little unrealistic. A stipulation for the law of the
domicil of either party is equally reasonable and should receive equal
sanction. The intention of the parties, let us again note, is not the
Code's "compleat reader" for choice-of-law rules.
The second gloss for choice-of-law rules, governmental interest,
is, in the case of commercial contracts, shallow and ephemeral.
Public policy and governmental concern may play a legitimate part
in personal relationships; the state is legitimately concerned with the
welfare of its dependents, with the support of its domiciliaries; it is
concerned with the separation agreement and the contract to create
a trust for dependents, for example, but certainly the state has no
such intimate concern for the negotiability or non-negotiability of a
promissory note issued there or for determining whether a subsequent
holder acquires a valid title despite a prior theft of the instrument
and a prior forgery of an indorsement.
The parties themselves are, however, intimately and intensely
32 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) at 199.
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concerned with those issues and with knowing with reasonable
certainty their respective rights and obligations. The Restatement
took measured strides to stabilize choice-of-law rules in contract
cases. It did so by offering fixed and permanent rules. That they are
not harsh rules is illustrated by the Hyatt, Badger and Guaranty
Trust Co. cases. That they are sufficiently at peace with considerations
of governmental interests and the intention of the parties is illustrated
by the same cases. This is not to suggest that the rationale which
runs through those cases or the rigid rules of the Restatement will
give complete certainty. They can give no more than uniformity.
This is so because the negotiable instrument is a traveler by nature.
Only a unitary choice-of-law rule would approach complete certainty.
If, for example, we should fix all obligations which inhere in com-
mercial paper in accordance with the law of the place of payment
and adhere to that rule regardless of where the "courier" might
wander, we would then find for the commercial instrument perhaps
not the "center of gravity" but a home to which the obligations of
all parties to the instrument will eventually come and we would there-
by reduce immeasurably the shifting obligations which spring from
shiftless choice-of-law rules.
It would be folly to expect any substantial acceptance of a
unitary choice-of-law rule for commercial transactions generally or
for commercial paper specifically. The Restatement's imprint is on
the law of too many of the non-Code states. The mark of the Re-
statement, we can be sure, will not be readily erased. But it remains
to be seen whether courts in the Code states will take the Code's
sanction of "judicial decision" 83
 to prescribe, if not a unitary rule,
then uniform, overriding rules of choice of law or whether we shall
be left to "dusk and shiver" with the vagaries of contacts, intention
and governmental interests.
83 UCC § 1-105 Comment 3.
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